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The takeover of substantial number of shares, voting rights or control in a listed Indian 
company attracts the provision of SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) 
Regulations 1997. The regulations have been amended nearly 20 times since inception, though 
the amendments have mainly concentrated on areas which needed no amendment. At the same 
time a vast number of obvious problems have not been rectified in the regulations. The large 
number of amendments have also created requirement of a compulsory tender offer of such 
unnecessary complexity as to make it virtually unintelligible to even a well qualified 
professional.  
 
This paper argues that the complexity in the trigger points for disclosure and tender offer 
introduced over the years lacks a philosophy, and most of the amendments can not only be 
deleted but a very simple structure can be introduced making compliance of the regulations 
straight forward and easy to understand by management of listed companies. Certain other 
areas which need amendments have also been discussed. Chief amongst these are the 
provisions relating to consolidation of holdings, conditional tender offers, hostility to hostile 
acquisitions, definitional oddities, payment of control premium in the guise of non compete 
fees, treatment of differential voting rights, treatment of Global Depository Receipts and 
disclosure enhancements. 
 
This paper does not try to portray a particular combination of numbers as the best possible set 
of trigger points and compulsory acquisition numbers but advocates that whatever numbers 
are adopted should not be changed for several decades. Arguments that state that the 
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INTRODUCTION 
The takeover regulations have been in existence since several decades within the listing 
agreement between companies and stock exchanges. In 1994 a modern set of SEBI 
regulations replaced the former provisions, and in 1997 the regulations were replaced by 
the current SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations 1997 
(the regulations).  
 
The 1997 regulations have been amended 19 times over the past 13 years. A vast majority 
of these amendments kept modifying numbers in trigger points for disclosure and 
compulsory tender offers contained in the regulations. To give just one example, the 
concept of ‘creeping acquisition’ exemption was modified from 2% in 1997 to 5% in 
1998 to 10% in 2001 to 5% in 2002  to a modified 5% in 2008. In other words, most of 
them tried to second guess the wisdom of the original or amended or even subsequently 
amended numbers again and again. The amendment also brought in some unnecessary 
complexity and certain improper treatments which militate against the philosophy of 
equity on which the regulations were framed.  
 
This paper first looks at the various trigger points for a compulsory tender offer which 
need to be simplified into a simple and easy to follow set of trigger points with a 
consistent philosophy. It then looks at certain persistent oddities contained in the 
regulations including the definition of a date, the permissibility of non compete payments 
and the treatment of differential voting rights. It then looks at certain regulations, 
specifically the proviso to regulation 12 and conditional tender offers which need to be 
modified or deleted to bring them in line with the purpose of the regulations. Finally the 
paper looks at improving the quality of disclosure filed by an acquirer on acquiring a 
substantial number of shares, votes or control.  
 
Trigger points for compulsory tender offer needs to be simplified. 
The takeover regulations mandating a compulsory tender offer to public shareholders is 
triggered on any one of the following thresholds being reached:    
1.) Acquisition of shares or voting rights of 15% or more; (inclusive of the shares 
or voting rights already held by the acquirer or by the persons acting in 
concert). Thus a person holding no shares can acquire up to 14.99% voting 
rights and a person holding 10 % could acquire up to 4.99% voting rights. The  
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holding should be such as would entitle the acquirer to exercise 15% or more 
of the voting rights in a listed company according to Regulation 10.  
2.) Regulation 10 implies that a 12% holder of voting equity cannot buy 5% 
without triggering the tender offer, but a 20% or a 49% holder is exempt from 
the tender offer on acquiring upto 5%. This convoluted system allows creeping 
acquisition above 15% but not between 10 and 15% levels of existing 
shareholding. In addition 15% is the hard boundary, if by acquiring even one 
share a person reaches or crosses 15%, the tender offer trigger is reached.  
3.) Acquisition of more than 5% of shares or voting rights in any financial year 
ending on 31
st March when the acquirer holds 15% or more but less than 55% 
of the shares or voting rights of the company concerned would also trigger the 
compulsory tender offer according to Regulation 11(1). This is consistent with 
the listing agreement for most companies which require a minimum public 
shareholding of 25% because if a person with 55% acquires a single share and 
then is required to make a tender offer for 20%, the acquirer would not be 
breaching the listing agreement (except by one share).  
4.) Where such acquisition is for less than 5% in a year (as defined), then it is 
exempt in what is known as creeping acquisition exemption under the same 
regulation 11(1).  
5.) Also exempt is acquisition of shares or voting rights up to 5% (one time
i), 
where the acquirer already owns or controls between 55 to 75% votes, if the 
same is the result of buy back of shares by the company or purchases are made 
through open market purchases as per Reg. 11(2) second proviso. This 
exemption is subject to an upper holding limit of 75% in case of all companies 
irrespective of minimum public shareholding requirement under the listing 
agreement. 
6.) Acquisition of even a single shares or voting right where holding is already 
55% or beyond the exemption given in 5) above would trigger the tender offer 
according to Regulation 11(2). Where a person already holds say 60% and 
acquires further shares, and thus makes a tender offer which is fully 
subscribed (i.e. 20%), the acquirer would be holding 80 % post tender offer. In 
such a case, if the acquirer is breaching the listing agreement which imposes a 
condition of public shareholding of a minimum of 25%, the acquirer must 
bring down his holding within a time period permitted by the exchange to be 
again in compliance with its agreement. In the same facts where the listing  
   
IIMA  y  INDIA 
Research and Publications 
W.P.  No.  2009-11-06  Page No. 5 
agreement only requires a minimum 10% public shareholding, the acquirer 
can continue to hold the 80% shareholding. In another fact scenario of a 
company with a listing agreement for a minimum of 10% public shareholding, 
where a person is already in control of 76% voting equity, acquires further 
voting rights, and the tender offer for 20% takes his holding to 96%, he must 
again divest his voting rights to below 90% levels within a period prescribed 
by the exchange. 
7.) In a company with a minimum public shareholding of 25%, any acquirer 
already holding 75% or more would be prohibited from acquiring further 
shares as it would result in direct breach of the listing agreement except 8) 
below.  
8.) Regulation 11(2A) read with Reg. 21 (3) provides for a special route of 
acquisition which does not mandate a 20% tender offer.  
9.) Acquisition of direct or indirect control with or without acquisition of shares 
or voting rights would also trigger the tender offer requirements according to 
Reg. 12.  
 
As can be seen above, there are a very large number of unnecessary and convoluted 
trigger points for a compulsory tender offer to be triggered. Complexity devoid of any 
rationale or philosophy ought to be avoided. There is a need to simplify this unnecessary 
complexity while keeping the philosophy of the regulations alive.  
 
Proposed trigger points 
It is proposed that there should only be one trigger on acquisition of over 5% unless the 
acquirer owns less than 15% shares of the target company. This would enable a person to 
acquire up to 15% shares i.e. up to a control figure, and not trigger a compulsory tender 
offer. Where a person owns any number of shares up to 50% such person should be 
entitled to purchase shares or voting rights up to 5% each year by way of creeping 
acquisition. Any acquisition over 55% should not be allowed without a compulsory 
tender offer of such number of shares as would result in a post acquisition public 
shareholding of at least 25%. This is consistent with the view of the Finance Ministry that 
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Consolidation of holdings 
In Reg. 11(2A), the regulations have created a special category of acquisitions called 
consolidations which permits a tender offer to be for less than 20% of voting shares under 
Reg. 11(2A). This exemption from the 20% of equity tender acquisition rule is an 
unnecessary loophole as there is practically no distinction between Reg. 11(2) and Reg. 
11(2A). While Reg. 11(2) mandates a 20% tender offer even on acquisition of a single 
share beyond creeping acquisition exemptions (typically 5% in a year between 15% and 
55% holding levels), 11(2A) seems to allow a company to make a tender offer for say 
10% if the number is consistent with the minimum public shareholding prescribed in the 
listing agreement (which is typically 10% or 25%).  
 
Proposal – delete the provisions relating to consolidation of holdings 
The two provisions create an unnecessary legal arbitrage between acquiring no shares and 
acquiring one share, where the choice would determine whether an expensive 20% tender 
offer is required to be made or a cheaper, say 5%, tender offer is required. Reg. 11(2A) 
thus should be deleted, removing the unnecessary regulatory arbitrage. In any case if the 
regulations are simplified as proposed in the previous proposal, this provision would 
automatically stand deleted.  
 
Conditional tender offer 
Regulation 21A provides for an offer conditional upon the level of acceptance. The 
regulation lacks clarity. It seems to allow an offer conditional as to level of acceptance 
which may be less than 20% subject to the provisions of regulation 22(8). It also has a 
proviso which states that where the public offer is in pursuance of a memorandum of 
understanding, such MoU shall contain a condition to the effect that in case the desired 
level of acceptance is not received, the acquirer shall not acquire any shares under the 
MoU and shall rescind the offer. The use of the word “provided that where” seems to 
suggest that the exemption from making a minimum of 20% public offer extends to all 
compulsory tender offers. For instance, to take a literal view of the regulation, a person 
can make an offer of 20%, stating that the acquirer will refuse to accept the offer if 
acceptance is below say 18%. Where a person has acquired shares from the market and 
triggered the tender offer, giving such a right to the acquirer would be unfair, and in fact 
SEBI does not permit such an interpretation. What the regulation is trying to say is that 
only where acquisition of shares is by way of a memorandum of understanding which can 
be revoked, can a person make such a conditional offer; because there would not be any  
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acquisition of voting right as the whole tender offer and the primary acquisition could be 
reversed altogether. Reversal of trades is impossible without disturbing the public markets 
if the primary acquisition is made from the markets.  
 
Proposal – recalibrate words of conditional tender offer 
Thus the conditional offer should be only available in acquisitions made by way of 
private agreements which can be reversed if the conditional offer is not satisfied and not 
in every acquisition of shares from the market which are incapable of being reversed. 
This is the way SEBI implements the regulation, but the position is different on a literal 
reading of the regulation.  
 
Friendly change of control exemption 
Control could be acquired by acquiring a small number of shares in a company with a 
highly dispersed shareholding. In addition, indirect control includes acquisition of control 
of the target company by acquisition of parent companies, whether listed or unlisted and 
whether in India or abroad. Acquisition of control would however not trigger the 
Regulations if approval by special resolution of the general body of shareholders of the 
target company is obtained through postal ballot. The rationale for this exemption is not 
clear, and it should perhaps have been deleted with the exemption for other friendly 
acquisitions like the preferential allotment exemption under the erstwhile exemption in 
Reg. 3(1)(c)
iii. In the year 2002, the large loophole of an exemption from a compulsory 
tender offer to preferential allotments was deleted. With this deletion a vast bulk of 
friendly takeovers which were exempted under this provision, were no longer exempt. 
The erstwhile exemption created a disparity between friendly acquisition and hostile 
acquisition. The exemption ran counter to the philosophy of the regulations, as it was wholly 
immaterial to the public shareholders whether the acquirer was friendly to the existing 
management/promoters of the company or not. In the circumstances, the exemption created 
regulations which had robust doors for security but which had no walls. 
 
However, the other similar exemption in the proviso to Regulation 12 that “Provided that 
nothing contained herein shall apply to any change in control which takes place in 
pursuance to a special resolution passed by the shareholders in a general meeting” was 
not deleted. With the result that there continues to be a disparity between friendly change 
of control and hostile change of control particularly where the dominant promoter owns a 
substantial part of the target company to enable passage of a special resolution in a  
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general meeting. 
 
Many jurisdictions permit what is known as white wash of acquisition. This means that a 
compulsory tender offer is not triggered where the shareholders by special majority waive 
a right of compulsory tender offer. This exemption is rightly not added in India because 
the large number of companies with large promoter holdings would mean that the 
majority would subvert the interest of minority simply by passing a special resolution of 
shareholders which is calculated on the basis of those shareholders present and voting.  
 
Proposal – delete the exemption in Reg. 12 proviso 
The exemption is a remnant from the days when all friendly takeovers were exempt from 
the tender offer regulations. This was clearly recognized by SEBI as inappropriate in 
2002, because it made no difference to the public shareholders whether or not the change 
in control brought in persons on good terms with the existing management/promoters or 
not. In either case the public shareholders need to be given an exit opportunity. Clearly 
this proviso ought to be deleted as a continuation of the private placement exemption 
deletion.  
 
Acquisitions must be netted off 
It was the view of Bhagwati Committee that purchases should not be netted off for 
calculating the acquisition of shares and votes.  For example, if a person acquires 3% 
shares then sells 2% and again acquire another 3% such person would be required to 
make a disclosure under the recommendation of the Bhagwati Committee. However 
nothing in the regulations seem to point towards such an interpretation. SEBI has 
sometimes relied upon the committee report to calculate such position on a gross basis. 
This is incorrect in both principle and in practice because at no point of time the person is 
acquiring substantial number of shares triggering the disclosure or the tender offer norms.  
 
Proposal on netting off 
It is proposed that all acquisitions must be netted off. All positions must be calculated at a 
particular point of time after all sales and purchases are accounted for. It should be made 
clear that acquisitions are of net positions and there should not be any other interpretation 
possible. There is a need to put this in black and white so that there is no scope for interpretation 
which results in this view.  
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Date 31
st March definition 
The takeover regulation were amended in 2002 replacing the words ‘in any period of 12 
months’ with ‘in any financial year ending on 31
st March’. This unnecessary amendment 
to regulation 11 with relates to triggering of a compulsory tender offer beyond a creeping 
acquisition, results in a completely unfair situation. For instance, the regulations restrict a 
person from acquiring more than 5% shares in a whole year i.e. 365 days. With the 
amendment, a person can acquire 10% shares in just 2 days between 31
st of March and 1
st 
of April of any year.  
 
Proposed definition of date – revert to the original definition 
The original definition ought to be brought back because though the regulations seem to 
indicate that no person should acquire over 5% in a whole year, it permits acquisition of 
10% in just two days. This unfair amendment ought to be reversed with the original 
wordings brought back. 
 
Non compete payment 
It has been seen that acquirers routinely pay control premium to select sellers to the 
exclusion of public shareholders subsequently in a tender offer. They do this under the 
provisions of regulation 20(8) - which provide for payment of non compete fee. SEBI has 
tried to disallow the payments in cases where there was no possible competition between 
the acquirer and the select sellers. However SAT has struck down SEBI’s intervention in 
those cases. Particularly unfair is a case where the acquirer made the non compete 
payment to the existing promoters who had made the company virtually sick because of 
their incompetence
iv. Further many shares were sold by public charitable trusts controlled 
by the promoters, which were also held to be entitled to the non compete fee even though 
by law the public charitable trusts could not carry out any business.  
 
Proposal – delete the provision for non compete payments 
It is clear that the provision for non-compete is used for actually paying a control 
premium to the selling shareholders. This differential payment militates against the 
philosophy of fairness in the regulations. It is time that this much misused provision is 
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Treatment of differential voting rights (DVRs) 
The regulations do not provide a clear impact of the takeover regulation where a target 
company has several types of equity shares, particularly where they have differential 
voting rights. It is not clear whether the regulations mandate an acquirer to make a 
compulsory tender offer for 20% of total voting power or they mandate an offer for 20% 
of each class of equity shares. The former would be a fairer means of calculating the 
nature of the compulsory tender offer because an acquirer has interest in acquiring voting 
rights and would be interested in lower voting rights only if he gets them at a 
proportionately lower price. Typically since a share with 1/10
th voting right does not 
quote at 1/10
th of the price of the share with one voting right, such shares would be 
entirely useless to an acquirer.  
 
Proposal – mandate acquisition of voting rights  
In light of the above discussion, it would be fair to allow the acquirer to acquire shares as 
he thinks fit instead of foisting useless shares on him by way of regulations. A person 
buying shares with fewer voting rights compared to other shares has bought them with his 
eyes open that they are likely to be quoted well below the market price of the other shares 
and may not at all be desirable in a corporate control case. Thus no unfairness is heaped 
upon such person. Conversely, an acquirer should not be heaped with an unnecessary cost 
and forced to acquire assets which are worthless to him. This change could be effected by 
means of a circular or other clarification.  
 
Treatment of ADRs/GDRs 
The regulations, till Sept 2009, exempted acquisition of American/Global Depository 
Receipts (ADR/GDRs) from a compulsory offer under the deeply flawed view that 
ADRs/GDRs do not carry voting rights till converted into shares. The current regulations 
too assume that there are two types of ADRs/GDRs i.e.. those 'entitled to exercise voting rights' 
and those which do not. Reg. 3 (as amended in September 2009) states: 
  
“(2) Nothing contained in regulation 10, regulation 11 and regulation 12 of these 
regulations shall apply to the acquisition of Global Depository Receipts or 
American Depository Receipts unless the holders thereof, - 
(a) become entitled to exercise voting rights, in any manner whatsoever, 
on the underlying shares; or  
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(b) exchange such Depository Receipts with the underlying shares carrying 
voting rights.” 
  
ADRs and GDRs do carry voting rights and they are in fact receipts representing shares. 
They are as much shares as are Indian shares held in Indian depositories. ADR/GDRs are 
convenient means of holding equity of a company in another country without worrying 
about the logistics of buying those shares overseas using an overseas broker, converting 
dividends into local currency etc. For this purpose two sets of ‘depositories’ are used. The 
Indian depository which effectively holds, say 10 million, shares of that company and 
thus taking them out of circulation from the Indian market. Simultaneously, the foreign 
depository issues ADR/GDR securities for the same number (though often they are issued 
in a ratio — say 1 ADR to represent 2 shares) to depository receipt holders in the US 
market. These DR holder have all of the same rights as an Indian shareholder, for 
example, right to receive dividend, right to vote and right to residual value on liquidation 
of the company. 
 
As far as the right to vote is concerned, it is governed by the contract between the DR 
holder and the depository (any financial company or even a local friendly bank could be a 
depository). There are four types of contract terms which could govern this contract a) the 
depository will take instruction from the DR holder and vote according to that wish b) the 
depository will vote according to what is in the best interest of the shareholders c) the 
depository will vote in favour of existing management d) the depository will not vote the 
shares. Only in the last case are votes not exercised. However, even then, the shareholder 
has the power to vote the shares – it is just that he has contracted away the power to 
someone else who will abstain from voting. If the shareholders had collectively 
negotiated, they could have got these rights and can always claim these by amending their 
agreement. This is similar to an Indian shareholder who agrees with another person 
(whether an individual, company, bank or institution) by way of a shareholder agreement 
that he will not vote the shares. The law cannot be influenced by the terms of a private 
agreement on voting arrangements particularly as there is no need for votes not to be 
exercised by the depository. The key to understanding takeover regulations is the power 
to exercise rather than its actual exercise. 
 
The regulations till September 2009 treated ADR/GDRs as securities without voting 
rights and thus exempt them from the applicability of the tender offer requirements on  
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substantial acquisition. They still maintain the dichotomy between those DRs with voting 
rights and those without. This is particularly perverse where the ADR/GDRs are held by 
the promoter group itself and they get all the rights without the obligation to make a 
tender offer to shareholders on large acquisitions.  
 
Proposal – treat ADRs as shares 
The amendment to regulation 3 in late September 2009 means that where voting rights are 
in fact exercised, the exemption will be removed. However, the exemption is still retained 
for cases where the DR holder gives up his rights to the depository. Having corrected 
three fourths of the inappropriate law, we now need to move forward and correct this 
perversity as well, in other words, the entire exemption for DRs should be `deleted.  
  
Other areas which need a re-look 
Materiality in indirect acquisitions: The takeover panel and SEBI have often used the 
wrong test when looking at change of control arising out of change of control of foreign 
parent of a company. They have often applied the test of materiality i.e. whether the target 
company is a small part of the foreign parent or not. This test is wrong because the 
regulations seek to protect the interest of the target shareholders, and it is immaterial to 
them whether they are a small part of the parent or a more substantial part.  
 
Disclosure triggers rationalization: Regulation 7 mandates disclosure at 5, 10, 14, 54, 
and 74% levels of acquisitions and also every 2% purchase/sale of shares after acquiring 
15% shares. This is duplicative. The disclosure triggers can be modified to 5, 10 and 15% 
and every 2% purchase/sale for those holding over 15% shares. 
 
Content of disclosures: In the formats appended to the disclosure norms of the regulations 
i.e. Regs. 7 and 8, too little information is sought from the acquirer. What can be added to 
the regulations for disclosure by the acquirer on buying substantial number of shares or 
voting rights is as follows: 
 
•  Purpose of acquisition? i.e. whether it is for a control motive or investment 
motive. 
•  How the acquisition will be financed? This is important for the investor to know 
because if the company will become a debt laden entity, a shareholder would find 
it an important input in deciding whether to hold onto the shares or not.   
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•  Whether there are any plans by the acquirer to restructure the company on a future 
date? 
•  Method of acting in concert. Where several people are acting in concert, when did 
the concert begin and if an agreement was signed to create a group, when the 
agreement was entered into. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper does not try to portray a particular combination of numbers as the best 
possible set of trigger points and compulsory acquisition numbers but advocates that 
whatever numbers are adopted should not be changed for several decades. The paper also 
advocates a simple regulatory regime which determines the triggers for the disclosure 
norms and the tender offer.  Arguments that state that the changing economic condition 
requires constant changes with these numbers, it is argued is wrong.  
 
There is much that needs to be worked on, and importantly, there should be no tinkering 





                                                 
i This is a one time exemption of 5% which can be over any period of time and in as many tranches. This is 
not a 5% per annum exemption as is creeping acquisition. See SEBI circular CFD/DCR/TO/Cir-
01/2009/06/08 dated 6 Aug 2009. 
ii Ministry of Finance’s “Discussion paper on requirement of public holding for listing”, 9 Jul 2009 
iii The preferential allotment exemption contained in the now deleted Reg. 3(1)(c) exempted from the tender 
offer requirement any acquisition which was a result of a preferential allotment. In effect this exempted all 
friendly acquisitions and defeated the purpose of the regulations. 
iv Cemetrum v. SEBI [2008] 83 SCL 374 (SAT) 